心灵哲学.ppt

Philosophy of Mind
Lecture Seven: Supervenience and Zombies
Today’s Lecture
We will look at two problems for ttIT/property dualism.
Problem one: What is the connection between mental states and physical states if it isn’t identity?
Problem two: A revised version of the problem of causal closure.
Problem three: The possibility of zombies
Can we solve these problems without collapsing back into TTID?
Physicalism and Intimate Connections
ttID maintains that mental properties and physical properties are distinct.
The mental properties are non-physical properties that physical substances have.
So in that first sense, it’s a physicalist theory.
It is physical objects (like brains!) that possess these properties.
Physicalism and Intimate Connections
But physicalists generally want to go further.
They want to say that there’s an intimate connection between the physical properties and mental properties that an object has.
Example: The correlation between brain states and pain states.
The two states aren’t independent of one another.
Physicalism and Intimate Connections
If they were independent, they could hold in all kinds binations.
For instance, there could be people with your brain states that failed to have the appropriate mental states.
Further, there’d be no restriction on things having mental states no matter what their physical states.
Example: A lump of tofu being able to consider the results of the Coalition victory.
Physicalism and Intimate Connections
This is all crazy.
Endorsing ttID shouldn’t lead you into thinking the properties are so independent that tofu could think.
So even given ttID there should be some intimate connection between mental properties and physical properties.
Physicalism and Intimate Connections
But it’s not good enough just to say that there’s such a connection.
You can’t just stipulate that there are mental and physical properties, and some relation R between them and say that R is an intimate connection.
That’s just labelli