精选审计风险外文文献.docx

该【精选审计风险外文文献 】是由【小吴】上传分享，文档一共【49】页，该文档可以免费在线阅读，需要了解更多关于【精选审计风险外文文献 】的内容，可以使用淘豆网的站内搜索功能，选择自己适合的文档，以下文字是截取该文章内的部分文字，如需要获得完整电子版，请下载此文档到您的设备，方便您编辑和打印。TheAssociationbetweenIndividualAuditPartners’RiskPreferencesandtheCompositionoftheirClientPortfoliosEliAmirLondonBusinessSchoolRegent’sPark,LondonNW14SA,******@-PekkaKallunki*UniversityofOulu,,FIN-90014UniversityofOulu,FinlandJuha-Pekka.******@,,SE-11383Stockholm,SwedenHenrik.******@*(Italy),theUniversityofCyprus,IEBusinessSchool(Spain),theNorwegianBusinessSchool,BI(Norway),theUniversityofNewSouthWales(Australia),theUniversityofAuckland(NewZealand),theUniversityofOulu(Finland)andVictoriaUniversity(Wellington,NewZealand),?,Sweden(DNR08:074?).TheAssociationbetweenIndividualAuditPartners’,weexplorewhetherauditpartners’attitudetowardsrisk,asmeasuredbytheirpersonalcriminalconvictions,’criminalconvictions,wefindthattheclientsofauditpartnerswithcriminalconvictionsarecharacterizedbygreaterfinancial,,pensatingthemforacceptingriskierclients,:M41,M42,G30,K42Keywords:AuditPartners,CriminalConvictions,ClientPortfolios,AuditRisk,AccountingConservatism1OntheAssociationbetweenIndividualAuditPartners’’portfoliomanagementdecisionsareaffectedbytheclient'sperceivedrisk,andthatauditorsassessclientriskonthebasisofclient-haracteristics,suchasfinancialcondition,,,littleisknownabouthowindividualauditpartners'personalriskpreferencesaffectclientportfoliodecisions,,becauseinmanycountries,includingtheUnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdom,,sucharequirementiscurrentlyinpracticeinsomecountries,'personalriskpreferences,asmeasuredbytheirpossiblepriorcriminalconvictions,See,forinstance,ChinandChi(2024)al.(2024).ountingOversightBoard(PCAOB)mentsonwhetheritshouldrequireengagementpartnerstosignauditreportstoincreasetransparencyandenhancepartners’accountability(PCAOB2024).2Thecriminalconvictionsdiscussedherearenotrelatedtotheauditors',wearguethatcriminalconvictionsindicateagreaterpropensityforrisk-taking,-takingbehaviorandonrecentstudiesthathaveconsideredeitherexplicitlyorimplicitlyauditors'’,heeffectofthispersonalattributeonaspecificaspectoftheauditwork–theleveloftheclientportfoliorisk–whereauditors’risk-taking,resultingeitherfromprofitmaximizationoroverconfidence,,ofwhom53havebeenordingtoofficialcourtrecords,,’characteristicsinauditengagementsbyexploringhowauditpartners’personalriskpreferencesaffecttheirInparticular,(2024)pointsout,verylittlepensationforisknownaboutthepeoplewhoconductaudits,’,,wefindthatclientsofconvictedauditpartnershaveagreaterfinancialrisk,asreflectedintheirfinancialratios,andagreatergovernancerisk,position,,clientsofauditpartnerswithcriminalconvictionshaveagreaterfinancialreportingrisk;,onaverage,higherthaninthoseperformedbyauditorswithoutcriminalconvictions,,ourresultsshowthatauditpartnerswithcriminalconvictionsaremorelikelytobemalesemployedinNon-Big--5auditfirmsarelesstolerantofrisk-:,-TakingBehaviorBecker(1968)andEhrlich(1973)arguethatindividualsengageincriminalactsiftheexpectedgainfromthatactisgreaterthantheexpectedcosts;theseindividualsarewillingto3-,smallerauditfirmshavemorehigh--taking,,(1973)pointsout,animportantimplicationofthesemodelsisthatarisk-neutralindividualwillspendmoretimeonillegalactivitiesrelativetoarisk-avoider,andarisk-,criminalconvictionsreflectanindividual’srisk-,behavioralresearchlinkscrimetopersonalattributes,andinparticulartooverconfidence;individualswhoengageincriminalactivitiestendes(seeAideetal.(2024),Garoupa(2024),PalmerandHollin(2024),andWalters(2024)).Furthermore,SandroniandSquintani(2024)idents,andMcKenna(1993)showsthattheillusionofcontrol,relatedtooverconfidence,-takingbehavior;however,aspointedoutbyCarr-HillandStern(1979),,likeotherindividuals,possessdifferentpersonalcharacteristics,'personalcharacteristicsrelatedtotheirpropensitytotakerisk,,Schatzbergetal.(2024)findapositivelinkbetweenauditors’,(1998)findthatthemoreaggressiveauditpartnersoflargeauditfirmsareeptingtheclient',afindingthatisconsistentwiththeprospecttheoryofKahnemanandTversky(1979)–individualsarerisk-aversewithrespecttogainsandrisk-(1993)(2024)arguesthathigh-,suchasoverconfidence,.(2024)(1997)findthatauditorsareoverconfidentregardingboththeirownandtheirsubordinates’technicalknowledge;,recentstudieshavefocusedmoreonoffice-,ReynoldsandFrancis(2000)-firm-levelandoffice-levelanalyseshavegreatlycontributedtoourunderstandingofthecausesandconsequencesofauditrisk,qualityandpricing,,,auditors’,,paniesortoallowtheseountingiftheycanchargehigherauditfees(aformalmodelispresentedintheAppendix).Inaddition,behavioralstudiesimplythatauditors’criminalconvictionsmayreflectover-confidence,whichleadstomoreaggressiverisk--,Johnstone(2000)arguesthatauditpartnersevaluateclient-relatedrisks,-specificriskbyusingtheclient’sfinancialcondition(PrattandStice,1994),levelofcorporategovernance(CohenandHanno,2000),andqualityoffinancialreporting(CohenandTrompeter,1998).(1998),FrancisandKrishnan(2024)epthigh-,thequestionofhowauditpartners’